There are situations where all the parties involved would instinctively know what is unfolding, without necessarily knowing why or how. Even more debilitating is the knowledge that it would unfold irrespective of what they do or don’t do.
All they can do is hope to delay the inevitable and prepare for a hard landing — which they may or may not survive in good shape, if at all.
The post-Sheikh Hasina situation in Bangladesh is characterised by this indelible sense of deterioration. The worst helplessness is the one before the catastrophe; its clouds have cast gloom over the forlorn country.
Discrimination in Both Explicit & Implicit Forms
Let’s begin with an illustrative incident. On 11 December, Dhaka Tribune reported that a group called Muslim Consumers’ Rights Council demanded a ban, and boycott too, on restaurants that don’t serve beef. This unremarkable small gathering remarkably points to the heart of the beast.
"Although eating camel meat is not obligatory, it became essential for a Muslim due to its connection to Jewish dietary laws. Similarly, in the context of Hindu beliefs, consuming beef becomes a declaration of faith for Muslims," the convenor of the protesting organisation reasoned.
Along with actual atrocities committed against minorities, increasing acceptance of such quasi-political theological reasoning among the majority population and its blunt articulation by the radical outfits amply demonstrate where the country is headed. If the idea of beef festivals was a progressive invention in India, it is being reinvented as a weapon of the majority in Bangladesh.
This rejuvenated religious belligerence in Bangladesh society is the theme behind multiple isolated instances of violence across the country, both communal and political. They include the arrest of former ISKCON (International Society for Krishna Consciousness) priest Chinmoy Krishna Das and the communal attacks, such as in Chattogram and Sunamgonj.
While violence and aggression have been a part of Bangladesh's politics ever since the 1971 liberation war, these episodes are of a different character – because the norms of Bangladeshi politics have changed.
The pattern of politics after a revolutionary shake-up can be illustrated with a metaphor from natural sciences. Once the fervent period of overthrow and capture of power is over, the polity cools and crystallises into a new structure with the least possible entropy. Parties, social groups, and institutions realign themselves so that they occupy advantageous positions within the new social order. Normal politics resumes, but in a new guise and under new norms.
The New Norms of Bangladeshi Politics
Today, persecution is in the Bangladeshi air. Both the minorities and the Islamists – would-be victims and the perpetrators – distinctly recognise this possibility, this new norm. Under the Awami League regime, the political hegemony built against the 1971 genocide meant that such a thought remained impermissible in the social realm. Any expression of genocidal intent or apologetics would result in a swift reprisal from the state. With the collapse of the League regime, this hegemonic grip has loosened.
Moreover, the question of persecution has now shifted from the political realm to the social. In other words, the ‘axis of happening’ has shifted from the political to the social. In this situation, the initiative for radicalisation comes from the grassroots level.
A general attitude of persecution, which could lead either to expulsion or destruction of the one-crore plus minority population in the country, has taken root in Bangladesh at the societal level. Understanding this shift is key to appreciating the dilemma of the Muhammad Yunus government.
The Yunus government certainly has no agenda, or ideological inclinations, for persecuting the minorities: however, they also don't have the political resonance to spot these tremors.
They are increasingly becoming irrelevant, as localised radicalisation and governmental interests diverge. While the Yunus government wishes to focus on making the Bangladesh economy great again through apolitical growth, they are prisoners to the emerging moral consensus that opposes the presence of any and all Indian institutions on Bangla soil. Without the kind of political highhandedness which characterised Sheikh Hasina, they would soon be unable to resist being overwhelmed by this consensus.
Liberal governments tend to think that a society is free from the politics of persecution as long as state machinery is not involved, either passively or actively. Such a viewpoint mistakenly sees persecution as either an act of commission or omission by the state or a combination of both. However, persecution advances to the extremes of ethnic cleansing or genocide not necessarily with the help of the state.
Worst violations of human rights take place when there is state failure.
The biggest fear about the Yunus government is that it is bound to fail once the popular Islamist forces in Bangladesh push forward against it. Minority areas where the writ of the state is even suspended for a short duration can become dangerous sites of bloodshed.
Without a party or a mandate, the Yunus government doesn't have the wherewithal to think courageously or act decisively. As in Winston Churchill’s words – albeit in a different context – its fate is to be “decided only to be undecided, resolved to be irresolute, adamant for drift, solid for fluidity, all-powerful to be impotent.”
This is the danger in Bangladesh, as in most other Islamic societies. We may think of Egypt and Syria as other typical examples. On one side, there is grassroots radicalisation which demands from the other side a decisive and repressive state apparatus to contain it.
This dialectic ends up producing one of two dictatorships – either that of the Sharia law or that of a secular autocrat. In some societies like Saudi Arabia, it produced a mixture of both. The Yunus government either is trying to wish this dialectic away, or they are banking their hopes on economic rationality eventually overpowering the moral economy of Islamism.
What's at Stake for Minority Hindus??
The minorities, among whom the most vocal are the Hindus, are somewhat aware of these developments, even if they are not conscious of all the details. They have sensed that something dangerous is unfolding. The subtext of their political engagements becomes clear when read against this background.
The Hindus have largely organised themselves along an obvious path. They are voicing their demands in the language of minority rights.
The subtext, however, is the creation of institutional networks that would either bog down a future ethnic cleansing or serve as a ramp to exit Bangladesh.
In practical terms, if an exodus of minorities were to happen, either legally or illegally, they would first have to liquidate their property on a massive scale so that it can be transferred across borders. Democratic institutions in favour of minorities would at the very least buy them time to plan such an exit or safeguard their lives through whichever available means.
Within this broader minority anxiety, there has been a growing radicalisation of Hindus. A threat to the community is one of the best excuses to recruit its members to radical causes. While the Bangladesh police and judicial apparatus seem keen to blame ISKCON for this, the truth might be more subtle.
One clue lies in the slogan of the radicals – “Jai Sri Ram”, not “Jai Sri Krishna”. This sounds like a gesture of appeal and solidarity towards the Hindutva movement in India rather than an autonomous radicalisation of Krishna worshippers.
Not only is this an attempt at large-scale communication with the Hindutva ecosystem in India and thereby put pressure on the Indian state, but it also draws inspiration from the perceived success of Hindu radicals in India to try and intimidate Islamists, and sometimes Muslims as a whole.
There is no benefit to be gained from this strain of minority politics. At worst, such an impractical show of radicalism would accelerate the persecution of Hindus as a whole.
The natural interest of minorities in delaying or doing away with ethnic cleansing is paradoxically mirrored by a similar interest on the part of nearly every organised Islamist group in Bangladesh. These groups, which include the radicalised on-ground activists of nominally secular parties like the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), would not want to proceed with their plans just yet. Islamists draw lessons from each other’s projects, as well as ethnic cleansing efforts by other movements.
Just like the secular world, the Islamist world too would have observed the success of the Taliban and the failure of Myanmar. Taliban was a case study for the insurgency in Syria, and it surely would have been one for Islamists in Bangladesh too.
Every ethnic cleanser wants a clean ethnic cleansing. The limited success of the Myanmar army-supported efforts to clear out Rohingyas, and the later civil war would serve equally as negative examples for Bangla Islamists. Bangladesh borders Myanmar and hosts over a million Rohingya refugees in camps, with no repatriation or rehabilitation in sight.
The Islamists are thus faced with a marshmallow test, which rewards delayed gratification. Only the assurance of non-intervention from the native army – if not its total collaboration – can make a total ethnic cleansing possible.
The tide might be turning against minorities within the army and the police, but for now, the leadership of both institutions seems to be siding with the authority of the Yunus government. Further, there is the attention of international observers, including the US and India, to deal with. Under such conditions, widespread attempts at ethnic cleansing would result in a consolidation of non-Islamists even within Bangladesh, in an attempt to preserve the sovereignty of the nation and prevent international intervention.
The Paradox of BJP's Position
Being the biggest state in the South Asia region, the Indian ‘sphere of influence’ is something that both the Bangladesh government and the opposition parties within have to reckon with. The ‘anti-India sentiment’ in Bangladesh, much talked about in Indian media these days, draws from two distinct sources – one is the need for the new social order to distance itself from Sheikh Hasina’s legacy, and the other is the desire for unobstructed persecution of minorities.
The position of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is, however, paradoxical here. On the one hand, the party has dug a hole for itself by positioning itself against immigration, having incorporated a closed-border policy into its ideological project; also, the party might believe that readiness to accept refugees makes an exodus actually happen.
It recognises that it cannot afford an influx of refugees, both in terms of social stability and ideological demands. At the same time, the safety of Bangladeshi Hindus is of existential importance to the Hindutva project.
The BJP’s situation is complicated further by Indian opposition figures like Mamata Banerjee and Uddhav Thackeray, questioning the Central government regarding the ineffectiveness of its approach towards Bangladesh. Banerjee might have even broken an invisible boundary by broaching the demand for a UN peacekeeping force in Bangladesh.
UN peacekeepers are not extremely effective – the subtext, once again, is that intervention is being considered a real possibility in Bangladesh if and when the situation deteriorates. Another deeply troubling alternative can be gleaned from the histories of genocide: the lack of conditions for expulsions may create the conditions for destruction. If the Indian government prevents Bangladeshi minorities from seeking asylum within its borders, it may fast-track the latter.
(Arjun Ramachandran is a research scholar at the Department of Communication, University of Hyderabad. Kuriakose Mathew teaches politics and international relations at PP Savani University, Surat. This is an opinion piece, and the views expressed are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for them.)
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